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The role of intelligence in George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq shines a spotlight
on an issue that makes most observers of national security affairs extremely uncom-
fortable, regardless of their political persuasion. After all, despite an estimated annual
budget of $35 billion to $40 billion and many thousands of dedicated and bright em-
ployees using all the most sophisticated technologies available to the richest country
on earth, the U.S. intelligence apparatus knew remarkably little about what was actu-
ally going on inside Iraq. How could this have happened? Why did senior U.S.
ofªcials repeatedly make statements of certitude to back their justiªcations for the
war, assuring the public that these statements were based on “intelligence” and there-
fore, by implication, were credible?
The unfortunate truth is that the pattern of events during the eighteen months
preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq bore a striking resemblance to the 1980s,
when the United States and its vaunted intelligence apparatus were slow in recogniz-
ing the fundamental structural changes under way in the Soviet Union. These changes
initially made the Soviet Union less of a military threat to the United States and then
eventually pushed it into dissolution. In Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the So-
viet Union 1980–1990, David Arbel and Ran Edelist chronicle what seems like a chill-
ingly familiar refrain as they walk the reader through the decade in which the gradual
implosion of the Soviet political and economic system and the increasing desperation
of Soviet leaders were not fully appreciated by Western intelligence agencies and their
political masters.
If the book contains one interesting implicit conclusion that is again relevant to
current controversies, it is that the intelligence during the 1980s apparently played lit-
tle if any role in fundamentally altering the ideological and political predispositions of
senior decision-makers. As portrayed by Arbel and Edelist, senior ofªcial in the ad-
ministrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush essentially had their minds
made up and were politically and intellectually vested in their view of the Soviet
threat. As a result, they actively sought analysis from the intelligence community that
would conªrm their views and were unreceptive to any anomalous analysis. During
the U.S. presidential campaign in 1979–1980, Reagan described Moscow’s sponsor-
ship of terrorist organizations around the world as part of a systematic and diabolical
plot to destabilize the international system. In a related claim, Reagan’s ªrst director of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), William Casey, ªrmly believed that the Soviet
Union was aggressively confronting the West throughout the Third World. Using in-
terviews with former intelligence analysts, notably former senior CIA analyst Melvin
Goodman, Arbel and Edelist argue that no hard intelligence existed to support these
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wild claims. Even so, senior political ofªcials ordered the intelligence system to turn
out a product that conformed to their preexisting worldviews. Sound familiar?
In a particularly depressing and again familiar refrain, Arbel and Edelist recount
the rise of CIA ofªcials like Robert Gates, who provided analysis that the decision-
makers wanted to hear. The result was an intelligence system incapable of delivering
new or fresh analysis. As the authors note: “The common political orientation of the
intelligence professionals and the political elite over the years produced a rigid concep-
tual conformity between the analysts and the decision-makers” (p. 118). The result
was a self-reinforcing system that delivered politically acceptable analysis. Ofªcials
who produced appropriately couched assessments were promoted and rewarded by
their political masters.
Although intelligence analysis in the 1980s may have had little effect on the
country’s political leaders, the selective use of intelligence assessments proved ex-
tremely important in bureaucratic and political contexts. The intelligence estimates of
the 1980s and the Defense Department’s slick handbooks on Soviet Military Power
were cited as justiªcation for the massive increases in defense spending and the result-
ing explosion of the federal budget deªcit during the Reagan administration. The in-
formation also speciªcally justiªed a number of weapons systems—the B-1 and B-2
bombers to name two—that were all but militarily irrelevant by the time they had
been funded and built at a cost of countless wasted billions. The Reagan-era Strategic
Defense Initiative, which was sold to the public in the 1980s via inºated estimates of
the Soviet threat, is still with us today (albeit under a different name), consuming
many billions of dollars to produce what is widely seen as a technically ºawed system
that will not protect the country against the most likely threats of the twenty-ªrst cen-
tury. All these situations are usefully chronicled by Arbel and Edelist.
The strength of the book lies in its interesting vignettes. The authors draw on in-
terviews with ofªcials from all sides of the conºict, including former high-ranking So-
viet ofªcials, senior members of the Bush and Reagan teams, and former ofªcials in
the West European intelligence services. But the strength of the book is also a weak-
ness: it is poorly organized, and the reader is forced to labor through a discombobu-
lated story stitched together in a haphazard fashion.
Any serious student of national security affairs should be rightfully suspicious of
after-action analyses pointing out things that in hindsight should have seemed obvi-
ous at the time. Arbel and Edelist paint a depressing portrait of an intelligence bureau-
cracy during the 1980s that was hampered by its own organizational predispositions
and was ultimately more interested in serving its political leaders, who in turn re-
warded that system with funding and political patronage. But the picture was and is
more complicated than it appears in hindsight. Intelligence exists to support an opera-
tionally oriented environment in which it is difªcult to see issues in a truly strategic
context. That is the curse and the opportunity for intelligence—to meet both chal-
lenges simultaneously. The central issue facing the policy community—as true today
as it was in the 1980s—is to give the intelligence community sufªcient leeway to gen-
erate a product that meets the needs of the customer but is also in conformity with the
most reliable evidence.
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